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Of Levinas and Shakespeare:
“To See Another Thus”

“Together, the papers in this marvelous collection reveal the significance of
Shakespeare for Levinas and the significance of Levinas for Shakespeare.
At a time of keen interest in Shakespeare and philosophy, it will be welcomed by philosophers and literary critics alike.”
–Andrew Cutrofello, Professor of Philosophy,
Loyola University Chicago
“Coming upon the heels of the four-hundred-year anniversary of Shakespeare’s death, Of Levinas and Shakespeare offers a timely and ambitious
addition to the growing body of work on Levinas as a writer in peculiar
and often uncanny proximity to other writers. This collection explores
the nuanced play of affinities between 20th-century ethical philosopher
and Elizabethan dramatist/poet, and discloses ways in which Shakespeare
might be used to open up Levinas and not merely the other (and more
predictable) way around. If reading can be a way of inhabiting, a form
of living space, then this volume offers ample satisfaction for the room it
provides a range of audiences—scholars of Levinas and of Shakespeare,
students of ethical criticism, dialogists of literature and philosophy—to
dwell for a time ‘within.’”
–Adam Z. Newton, University Professor Emeritus,
Yeshiva University
“This valuable collection of essays responds to an observation Levinas made
after the War—to wit, that ‘the whole of philosophy is only a meditation
on Shakespeare.’ With this pithy remark, Levinas opened the work of the
great bard to our contemporary condition, as a profoundly self-reflexive,
indeed ethical, thinker. Through sustained cross-readings of Levinas and
Shakespeare, the essays take up dwelling in the tragedies and comedies
of Shakespeare, situating the ongoing renewal of the letter through new
insights. What are these revitalizing insights into Shakespeare of which
Levinas speaks? Above all, it is discerning, in the situations and characters
of the playwright, a testimony to the human encounter as infinite, as unlimited by concepts and the ongoing drive to unfold a story and to interrupt
it, holding it far from simple answers. Understood through Levinas’s eyes,
Shakespeare dramatized what the philosopher recognized as human worlds
peopled with figures, great and small, who are compelled by their respective others to respond and to seek justice. Students and teachers alike will
find in this collection innovative and thought-provoking avenues toward

reframing Shakespeare studies, and impressive stagings and illustrations
of Levinas’s challenging thought.”
–Bettina Bergo, Professor of Philosophy,
Université de Montréal
“These essays do not simply apply Levinasian concepts to Shakespeare,
which in Levinas’s terms would do violence to Shakespeare by bounding
his work with a conceptual schema. Instead, these astute and sympathetic
readings enable the Shakespearean literary world, which (as Hamlet suggests to Horatio) overflows the boundaries of philosophy’s dream, to speak
and listen to Levinas’s philosophical world, which overflows the boundaries
of the concept by rooting thought in ethics. This dialogue works hard to
preserve the concrete humanity and ethical grounding of both worlds.
Now more than ever, in an era that permits the reduction of the human
to the tweet, we need this kind of reading.”
–David P. Haney, President, Centenary University
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“I should ev’n die with pity,
To see another thus. I know not what to say.”
—Lear in Shakespeare’s King Lear (IV.vii. 52‑53),
quoted by Levinas in Humanism of the Other Man, p. 3
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Foreword
Andrew Cutrofello
The great Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi famously wondered whether
he was a man who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly
dreaming he was a man. It is helpful to remember this anecdote
when thinking about Levinas’s suggestion that “the whole of philosophy is only a meditation of Shakespeare.” As several contributors to
this volume point out, the genitive “of” (de in French) is ambiguous:
was Levinas saying that philosophy is a meditation on Shakespeare,
or that philosophy is a meditation by Shakespeare? Perhaps, like
Zhuangzi, he was wondering whether he was a philosopher dreaming
he was Shakespeare, or Shakespeare dreaming he was a philosopher.
Like so many philosophers, Levinas was fascinated by Shakespeare. One passage that especially fascinated him was the remark
that Banquo makes immediately after the witches vanish in Act 1,
scene 3 of Macbeth: “The earth hath bubbles, as the water has, / And
these are of them.” (1.3.79‑80) As Hilaire Kallendorf and Claire Katz
point out in their essay, Levinas cites these words several times over
the course of his career. In 1947 he compares being’s insinuation in
nothingness to “bubbles of the earth” (les bulles de terre) (Existence
and Existents, 57), and in 1965 he uses the same phrase to describe
the insinuation of the face into being. (“Phenomenon and Enigma,”
in Collected Philosophical Papers, 70) Finally, in a Talmudic reading
published in 1977, he characterizes the sacred (le sacré) as “bubbles
of Nothing in things.” (Nine Talmudic Readings, 141)
What exactly are these bubbles of the earth, and how can they
signify so many different things for Levinas? Let us briefly examine
the series:
(1) insinuation of being in nothing
(2) insinuation of the face in being
(3) insinuation of nothing in being
At first glance, (1) and (3) appear to be diametrically opposed.
According to (1), Banquo’s bubbles are bubbles of being: like the
spawn of a spontaneous generation, they literally appear out of
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nowhere. According to (3), however, the bubbles are bubbles of
nothing that flicker in and out of being. Perhaps we can resolve
this apparent contradiction by considering Banquo’s comparison of
bubbles of the earth to bubbles of the water. Bubbles of the water
are made not of water but of air. Of what are bubbles of the earth
made? Being? Nothing? Or something else?
Perhaps the correct answer is fire. This would be in keeping with
the witches’ chant, “Double, double, toil and trouble; / Fire burn
and cauldron bubble.” (4.1.10‑11) It would also round out the series
of metaphysical elements:
(bubbles of the) water: air
(bubbles of the) earth: fire
For Heraclitus, fire was the most basic of the four elements. Fire
was also a symbol or principle of becoming. Bubbles made of fire
would be in a state of perpetual becoming. As such, they would
involve both the insinuation of being in nothing and the insinuation
of nothing in being. Far from contradicting each other, senses (1)
and (3) would coincide.
Another way to explain the connection between senses (1) and (3)
has to do with sense (2)—the radically different notion that Banquo’s
bubbles involve the insinuation of the face in being. Beyond the
ontological categories of being, nothing, and becoming, a face signifies the transcendence of the good. Its appearance within being—its
transcendence within immanence—is essentially evanescent. It is,
as Levinas says, “immediately reduced to nothing, breaking up like
the ‘bubbles of the earth.’” (“Phenomenon and Enigma,” 70)
These bubbles are not made of fire. They are made of words.
They say something, though what they say is immediately dispersed,
leaving behind the residue of something said. Understood this way,
the sense of Banquo’s bubbles differs markedly from sense (3), the
insinuation of nothing in being in the experience of the sacred. For
Levinas, sacredness is fake transcendence. It is the sheen of the
nothing that is the “obverse” of being: bubbles signifying nothing.
Bubbles of the sacred are made of fire. If they represent the
insinuation of nothing in being, they can just as easily represent the
insinuation of being in nothing. Once again, the difference between
sense (1) and sense (3) turns out to be unimportant. This is confirmed by a passage from Levinas’s Prison Notebooks in which he
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remarks that Hamlet “suffers from the insinuation of nothingness
within being or of being within nothingness.” (Carnets de captivité, 174) The word “or” (ou) suggests that the two alternatives are
fundamentally interchangeable.
Had the poet Paul Celan translated Macbeth into German, as he
did twenty-one of Shakespeare’s sonnets, he might have forged one
of his characteristic compounds to render “The earth hath bubbles”
as Es gibt Erdblasen: “There are earthbubbles.” In French this could
be translated as Il y a des bulles-terrestres. As Peter Szondi points
out, Celan’s composite words are generally ambiguous. (Celan Studies, 66) They are “equivocators” that “palter with us in a double
sense.” (Macbeth, 5.8.20) This is true of “earthbubbles.”
On the one hand, the statement Il y a des bulles-terrestres names
the condition of the il y a: the inescapability of existence, whether
understood as the insinuation of being in nothing or the insinuation
of nothing in being. On the other hand, Il y a des bulles-terrestres
signifies signification: the opposite (or other) of a “tale / Told by
an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing.” (5.5.26‑28)
Banquo’s remark, “The earth hath bubbles, as the water has,” hovers
between these two senses.
Earthbubbles of various sorts abound in Of Levinas and Shakespeare: “To See Another Thus.” In his inaugural essay, Richard
Cohen notes that while other Shakespeare scholars have called
attention to the “reality of Shakespeare’s world,” Levinas reveals
“the even deeper link that binds the true to the good.” As several
other contributors point out, this link is indirectly indicated by the
way it goes missing in King Lear, the play from which this volume
draws its subtitle.
For Sandor Goodhart, Lear is an old man suffering from hysterica passio, the “mother” swelling up toward his heart. Instead of
welcoming the “gestation of the other” in himself, Lear protects
himself from it, insisting that he is a man more sinned against than
sinning. Ann Astell takes Lear to decline from an “unwise Solomon”
to “another Job.” She distinguishes the play’s horizontal axis of narcissistic rivalry from its vertical axis of ethical transcendence. The
two axes converge in the character of Edgar, the unaccommodated
man whose exposure on the heath awakens Lear’s pity. For Kent
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Lehnhof, Cordelia signifies ethical transcendence by “disincarnating”
God: her acts are “holy” (saint) rather than sacred.
Just as Astell discerns two axes in Lear, so Geoffrey Baker distinguishes two trajectories in The Merchant of Venice: Exilic wandering
and Odyssean circulation. Yet just as Goodhart shows that for Levinas the Exilic journey from self to other allows for a return to
an expanded sense of self as being-for-another, so Baker explains
how Shakespeare’s play calls into question conventional oppositions between Jews and Greeks, Jews and Christians, exchange and
gift-giving, law and mercy.
Kallendorf and Katz, in addition to tracking Levinas’s earthbubbles,
read the knocking at the gate in Macbeth as “an allegory of the Other’s demand for recognition.” Thomas de Quincey famously argued
that the knocking signifies the retreat of horror (“On the Knocking
at the Gate in Macbeth,” The London Magazine, October 1823),
but for Kallendorf and Katz it anticipates the call, expressed by
Macduff, to “countenance” horror. Something similar could be said
of the knocking in the final scene of Othello: Emilia’s cry at the
door, “My lord, my lord! (5.2.84) signifies the entrance of the third
party and the demand for justice.
Steven Shankman also deals with the passage from horror to
responsibility, not least in his reference to Franz Rosenzweig’s invocation of the “‘word and fire’ of the celestial Chariot of Ezekiel’s
vision.” (Here word and fire both belong to the order of signification.)
Shankman shows that Levinas’s distinction between the “superfluxion of the superfluous” (la superfluxion du superflu) and the giving of
bread “taken out of one’s own mouth” derives from Lear’s awakening
to the suffering of others (“Poor naked wretches. . .”). He concludes
that Lear dies of the mother that eventually reaches his heart.
Turning from drama to narrative poetry, Sean Lawrence reads
Venus and Adonis as a cautionary tale about the possessiveness of
concupiscent love. Because her love is violent, Venus can neither
convince Adonis to procreate nor transform his dead body into
something immortal, as Ovid’s Venus does. In a similar vein, Donald Wehrs shows how two of Shakespeare’s romances, Pericles and
Cymbeline, distinguish types of affection whose difference had not
been discernible in the world of Titus Andronicus. Tamora’s fierce
love of kin reappears in Dionyza and the Queen, but it is contrasted
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with the other-directed love of Marina and Imogen, the surrogate
daughters they attempt to kill.
Tamora reappears in David Goldstein’s startling comparison
between the cannibal meal in Titus and the plein air banquet in
As You Like It. As he explains in lines that I cannot resist quoting:
“both [plays] attempt to deal with the invented problem of the
vagina dentata by structuring a meal to defuse the threat. The difference between the tragedy and the comedy isn’t the philosophical
issues at stake, but rather the solutions to those issues. Cannibal
banquet? No thanks, I’ll have the fruit cup. But I’ll eat it down
here in my man cave.”
Goldstein is referring to Orlando, who eventually learns to eat
civilly with both men and women. At the end of As You Like It,
it is the melancholy Jaques who heads back to his (or rather the
Duke’s) man cave. Moshe Gold compares Jaques’ speech about the
Seven Ages of Man to a Mishnah in the Pirkei Avot about the stages
of religious education. Gold finds that Jaques misses an opportunity—both in the speech itself and in the blessings he offers each
of the marrying couples—to teach his listeners how to learn from
one another as they grow older together.
This observation is in keeping with Goldstein’s representation of
Jaques as a Montaignean skeptic with a “darker purpose.” Unlike
Levinas, for whom skepticism bespeaks inspiration, Jaques is a
burster of bubbles. He is more inclined to scoff at the soldier
“seeking the bubble reputation” (2.7.152) than he is to marvel at
the equivocal words of three weird sisters. Levinas, like the child
in Millais’ painting Bubbles, was a marveler. If it sometimes seems
to me that his entire philosophy is a meditation—or dream—of
earthbubbles, this is why.
Together, the papers in this marvelous collection reveal the significance of Shakespeare for Levinas and the significance of Levinas for
Shakespeare. At a time of keen interest in Shakespeare and philosophy, it will be welcomed by philosophers and literary critics alike.

Preface and Acknowledgments
Moshe Gold and Sandor Goodhart

Often a collection of essays by seasoned scholars gathered around
the work of two important writers from different times and places
constitutes a value of its own. Its assembly is designed to explore
whatever interesting consequences and new insights may be garnered from examining their writing in this uncommon conjunction.
And in this case, the bare fact that at the moment of our proposal to
Purdue University Press (that we might produce a book on Levinas
and Shakespeare) there were more than seventy-nine book-length
publications already available with phrases like “Levinas and” in the
title or subtitle but not a single tome linking Levinas to Shakespeare
is probably reason enough for a collection of this kind.
But the importance of this volume for those of us who have
worked on it is more than that. Levinas gets what Shakespeare is
doing. And he gets it because what Shakespeare is doing is what
he himself is doing in philosophy, which is to say, studying human
relations and human subjectivity in all of its complexity and infinite
variety. That may sound like a commonplace, but it’s not. Shakespeare and Levinas are working at two different ends of the same
theoretical spectrum: namely, constituting a meditation on “the
whole of philosophy.” “There are more things in heaven and earth,
Horatio, / than are dreamt of in your philosophy” (H 1.5.167‑168)
Hamlet remarks to his classmate, and we have to understand by
that remark a reference at once to learning in general (beyond the
confines of the study halls they may have attended at Wittenberg
where theology and philosophy were discussed) and to the human
capacity to think such thoughts in context of the full range of arenas in which ethical concerns for others (via faces, ghosts, and the
responsibilities they command) come to the fore.
* * *
There is another more practical reason. The book has something
of a fortuitous genesis. In 2014, I (Sandor) was invited by Kent
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Lehnhof to submit a paper to a projected volume on Levinas and
Shakespeare which I did (it remains substantially the one produced
below). The volume was assembled and submitted to a press in the
spring of 2015 and when the press returned it (for reasons perhaps
related to the fact that it would close its doors less than a year later),
Kent graciously offered the project to any of us willing to pursue it.
Since I myself was well into the planning of a conference on Levinas at Purdue (a meeting of the North American Levinas Society
in July of 2015) in which Ann Astell and Steven Shankman (who
had written about both writers) were participants, and since I knew
that Moshe Gold and Donald Wehrs were among the contributors
Lehnhof had invited for his project, I saw an oportunity. I invited
Ann Astell, Moshe Gold and Don Wehrs to deliver papers in a
session on Shakespeare and Levinas that I moderated (and to which
Steven Shankman responded) and the five of us—Astell, Shankman,
Gold, Wehrs, and I—met for lunch at Hillel afterwards.
The current volume was born of that communion. We decided
we would add papers of Astell and Shankman to the list of contributors to the volume among others (Richard Cohen’s essay, that had
pioneered philosophic thinking about the conjunction of the two
writers, was also added), and that Gold and I would explore the
potentials for the collection’s publication. The prospect of publishing with Purdue University Press a volume involving at least two
current or former Purdue faculty members seemed to me a natural
(I remain a professor of English at Purdue and Ann Astell was a
professor of English before moving to Notre Dame as a professor
of theology). I approached Peter Froehlich and the rest, as they say,
is history. Froehlich sent it out for review and when the letters that
came back were positive, he decided to publish the volume and that
it would be perfect for the book launch he was constructing. The
book that follows is an extension of these efforts.
The serendipity of these circumstances seems telling. Whatever
drew us individually as literary readers to the Levinas conference
(and Levinas’s understanding of the ethical) is probably not unrelated to whatever drew Levinas to Shakespeare to begin with, and to
the profound literary critical ethical reading with which the English
Elizabethan writer was already deeply engaged. One aim of this
book is to explore more fully that engagement.
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* * *
We are grateful to many people who have contributed in different
ways to the production of this book. We thank Kent Lehnhof for
his initial idea to gather together a collection of essays addressing
Levinas and Shakespeare. We thank Peter Froehlich, the newly
installed director of Purdue University Press who spotted the need
for and value of a volume like this one in our very first conversation.
His gathering of a staff of devoted workers—including Katherine
Purple, Rebecca Corbin, Susan Wegener, Leah Pennywark, Lindsey
Organ, Bryan Shaffer, and others who contributed to the production
of this book behind the scenes—assisted our efforts in countless
ways as did his personal enthusiasm for our work. We are grateful
to the outside readers of the manuscript of this volume who had
confidence in what they read and envisioned the value of seeing it
in print. The final manuscript benefited immeasurably from their
suggestions.
And we are grateful to others. Some of the material in this book
appeared in prior publications and we thank the publishers, editors,
and current owners of the rights to those publications for permission
to use versions of the following material.
In particular, we thank Michael P. Burton, director of the
University Press of New England, for permission to publish Richard
A. Cohen’s “Some Reflections on Levinas and Shakespeare” which
appeared in his book Levinasian Meditations. Ethics, Philosophy,
and Religion, published by Duquesne University Press (Pittsburgh,
PA) in 2010 on pages 150‑168; Gabriel Dotto, the director Michigan
State University Press (East Lansing Michigan) for permission to
reproduce the chart that Sandor Goodhart has used in his essay in
this volume and which originally appeared in his earlier book, The
Prophetic Law: Essays in Judaism, Girardianism, Literary Studies,
and the Ethical (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press,
2014) on page 214; John Morgenstern, the director and execuitive
editor of Clemson University Press, for permission to reproduce
Geoffrey Baker’s “Other Capital: Investment, Return, Alterity
and The Merchant of Venice” which first was published in The
Upstart Crow: A Shakespeare Journal, Volume 22 (2002), 21‑36,
by Clemson University Press; and George Leaman, Director of the
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Philosophy Document Center (Charlotteville, VA), for permission to
reproduce Steven Shankman’s “From Solitude to Maternity: Levinas
and Shakespeare” which was first published in the journal Levinas
Studies, Volume 8, number 1, pages 67‑79, by Duquesne University
Press (Pittsburgh, PA) in 2013.
Finally, we would like to express our gratitude and acknowledge
others from whom we have been privileged to learn who are not
mentioned above. “Much have I learned from my rabbis, even more
have I learned from my colleagues,” Rabbi Chanina says. “But from
my students I have learned more than from anyone else” (Ta’anit 7a).
20 October 2017 / 30th Tishrei 5778		Sandor Goodhart and
Moshe Gold

Abbreviations

References to the following works by Levinas are cited parenthetically, using the following abbreviations. References to other works
by Levinas are treated individually.
AT	
Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael B. Smith (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
BPW	
Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak,
Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1996).
BV	
Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans.
Gary D. Mole (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1994).
CC	
Œuvres Complètes Tome I: Carnets de captivité et autres
inédits (Paris: Grasset, 2009).
CPP	
Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).
DF	
Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Seàn Hand
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).
EE	
Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 2001).
EI	
Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1985).
EN	
Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith
and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press,
1998).
HO	
Humanism of the Other, trans. Nidra Poller (Urbana-
Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2005).
LR	
The Levinas Reader, ed. Seàn Hand (Oxford: Blackwell,
1989).
NT	
Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1994).
OB	
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981).
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PN	
Proper Names, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1996).
RB	
Is it Righteous to Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas.
Edited by Jill Robbins, (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2001).
TA	
Le Temps et l’Autre (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1979).
TI	
Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1969).
TO	
Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1987).
TTI	
The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology trans.
Andre Orianne (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1995).
References to the following works by Shakespeare are cited parenthetically, using the following abbreviations. References to specific
editions of Shakespeare’s works are treated individually.
AC
Antony and Cleopatra
AL
As You Like It
CY
Cymbeline
H
Hamlet
KL
King Lear
M
Macbeth
MA
Much Ado About Nothing
MND A Midsummer Night’s Dream
MV
The Merchant of Venice
P
Pericles, Prince of Tyre
R2
Richard II
TAN Titus Andronicus
VA
Venus and Adonis

Introduction
Moshe Gold and Sandor Goodhart

And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.
—Shakespeare (MND 5.1.14‑17).1
but whate’er I be,
Nor I nor any man that but man is
With nothing shall be pleased, till he be eased
With being nothing
—Shakespeare (R2 5.5.38‑41)
Shakespearean tragedy is above all the contact of man
and nothingness, of nothingness in its ambiguity [son
équivoque], in its diabolical form . . . . Shakespeare is
the fabricator of nothingness; he who gives to nothingness the appearances of being
—Levinas (CC 174)2

“[I]t sometimes seems to me,” Emmanuel Levinas writes, in one of
the first books he publishes after the war, “that the whole of philosophy is only a meditation of Shakespeare” (TO 72).3 “The whole of
philosophy.” For Levinas, that phrase includes, among other writers,
Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger; but also,
of course, the ancients—Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. Levinas’s
wording here is key. The entirety of philosophy for him is “a meditation of Shakespeare” (une méditation de Shakespeare), which
is to say, not “about” Shakespeare but “of” Shakespeare, “from”
Shakespeare, a part of Shakespeare’s subject matter, his work—his
plays, his poems. As if, for all of our critical acumen, we remain
already lodged entirely within Shakespeare’s writing, as figments of
his dramas, of his thinking about us.
What astounding humility! As if everything that I (Levinas)
am attempting to do, my entire phenomenological project—the
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r econstitution of European subjectivity on an ethical foundation—
were already within Shakespeare’s own philosophic reach. Have
other philosophers thought the same? Is not Shakespeare customarily relegated within philosophic writing—metaphysical and
phenomenological alike—to the category of aesthetics, and from
aesthetics, to dramatic literature and dramatic representation? Do
other philosophers really think their own thoughts were already
Shakespeare’s four hundred years ago?
What about literary critics—scholars or theoreticians of Shakespeare, for example? Do they see Shakespeare as groundbreaking
in the same way they see themselves (especially in the romantic
era)? Or rather, in praise of Shakespeare’s iconoclasm and “infinite
variety,” have they not ironically constructed an elaborate matrix of
inclusions and exclusions effectively “sacrificing” the critical commentary his writing offers us?4 The formal tradition of Shakespeare
criticism, from Pope, Johnson, and Dryden, through Wordsworth
and Coleridge, through Arnold, Bradley, Eliot, Leavis, Lewis, and
countless others, seems largely to have ignored the possibility that
Shakespeare’s writing is self-reflexive.5 Not challenging it, necessarily,
but putting it aside in pursuit of other more legitimate ends. Formal
and historical considerations have often superseded discussion of
Shakespeare as a critical thinker. Even considerations gathered from
psychoanalytic and, on occasion, religious studies are deemed permissible ahead of regarding Shakespeare as a bonafide commentator
on his own writing so long as such considerations are couched in the
appropriate cultural studies garb. Moral approaches as well remain
acceptable only so long as they echo the approaches of Kantian
and Hegelian philosophers who read in accord with the categorical
imperative or the end of history and the birth of modern secularism.
The European humanist perspective, in short, the primacy of the
subject of consciousness before objects of knowledge, would seem
the order of the day in both literary and philosophic study. In that
context, the idea that Shakespeare could be writing about us—about
the dramas in which we continue to live and work—would seem,
for the mainstream of critical thinking about Shakespeare (whether
within philosophy or literary study), not a little outrageous.
What if, in following Levinas’s post-war model, we take a critical
leap? Levinas distinguishes between the act of saying something and
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its reproduction some moments later as something said, between
le dire (the “to say” or “saying”) and le dit (the “said”).6 What if we
read Levinas’s claim as a challenge addressed to philosophers and
literary critics alike? Is the literary criticism of Shakespeare that we
consider “ethical” to be regarded henceforth exclusively as a meditation on what Shakespeare has already said, or can it be a meditation
on what he continues so powerfully to say to us in our current circumstances? Books on Levinas and more general philosophical topics
deriving from his work abound. Scholars have been able to identify
at least seventy-nine English language book titles (or subtitles) with
the words “Levinas and” or “and Levinas” followed (or preceded) by
the name of another writer or academic field. It is at least surprising,
given Shakespeare’s significant and positive influence on Levinas’s
corpus, that no single volume has yet appeared on the import of his
explicitly identified English literary predecessor upon the Jewish philosophic thinker, or of these two writers upon each other.7 Although a
handful of scholars have juxtaposed these authors in isolated essays,
there exists as yet no monograph or collection devoted to pursuing the
implications for philosophy, religious studies, and literary criticism of
the intricate and manifold relationships between these two towering
iconic figures of our Western intellectual tradition.8
One function of the current volume is to address that gap. But
the omission is odd in other ways. Wider nets have been cast. One
recent volume combines Shakespeare with discussion of Levinas
and some fifteen other philosophic thinkers—“celebrated authors
in Shakespeare studies and in continental philosophy” one notable
publisher’s blurb proclaims, a book that successfully “brings the two
fields into dialogue with each other.”9
One brief essay on Levinas and Shakespeare, however, does not
a book-length volume make.10 Upon the heels of the quadricentennial anniversary of Shakespeare’s death, perhaps the ghost of
one of Europe’s most revered literary writers can startle us from
our familiar competencies, our literary and critical complacencies,
and confront us with the obligations and responsibilities of a new
ethical criticism. Perhaps it is time for us, with Levinas, to say of
Shakespeare what Hamlet says of the ghost Shakespeare may himself
have once played on the Elizabethan stage, “O my prophetic soul!”
and “Meet it is I set it down” (H 1.5.41, H 1.5.108).
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In seeking to foster an ongoing dialogue between Shakespeare and
Levinas, the contributors to the current collection remain acutely
aware of the risks involved in their enterprise: the temptation to
repeat familiar readings of one or another writer rather than engage
their thought directly, the danger of reducing nuanced complexities
to a few aphorisms or paraphrases, the pitfalls of failing to know
enough scholarship within multiple fields of inquiry.
And then there are the risks associated with the genre of criticism
itself. Rather than attempt to apply some kind of “Levinasian” literary critical methodology to Shakespeare, or concomitantly endeavor
to affirm that Shakespeare has already engaged all that Levinas
would later discover in his philosophic or religious studies writing,
the writers in the current collection place Levinas and Shakespeare
side by side in asymptotic relationships with each other. For all their
different emphases, these essays collectively suggest that the proximity of one author to the other exposes respectively the discourses of
philosophy, literary studies, and religious studies (by which we have
traditionally understood them) to their deepest ethical dimensions
in ways that are both inspiring and precarious, ways that if pursued
more deeply or more distantly could turn out to have tragic and
comic potentials of their own. Indeed, the care shown in this volume
to both Shakespeare’s works and those of Levinas demonstrates the
potential for vibrant new scholarship to rethink in its entirety the
generic relation of tragedy to comedy.
The collection includes three previously published essays and
nine essays written specifically for this volume by a range of scholars, each of which sheds new light on the intriguing interrelation
of Shakespeare to Levinas and Levinas to Shakespeare. Some of
these essays discuss Levinas’s ideas in order to rethink early modern
genre theory. Others read Levinas to open up previously unexplored
aspects of individual plays. Still others contend that bringing to bear
upon Shakespearean and Levinasian scholarship the largely unacknowledged discourse of religious studies intensifies and enriches
any venture into ethical criticism. All promise to deepen our understanding of Shakespeare while demonstrating at the same time how
fruitful Levinas’s ideas can be in the study of literature.
Levinas can, for example, give us a better sense of what is at stake
in Shakespearean drama and can supply us with a rich vocabulary
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and sophisticated theoretical framework for describing its operation
and effects. Concomitantly, Shakespeare’s art can do much to clarify
the radical quality of Levinas’s philosophic thought. Unlike more
domesticated versions of ethical criticism, Levinas’s writing does
more than merely urge us in the direction of tolerance or acceptance: it challenges and rebuilds the very framework of subjectivity
from which such ethical claims proceed. Similarly, Shakespeare’s
plays and poetry, focusing as such writing often does upon the
necessity and difficulty of responding to the demands of another
person in comic, tragic, historical, and romantic contexts, gains clarity from Levinas’s untangling of our infinite responsibility for the
other individual, for the other person or neighbor standing there
alongside of me, as opposed to the abstract idea of the other we commonly invoke. The arresting singularity of Shakespeare’s humanized
characters, the vivid particularity of his humanly imagined worlds,
constitutes technical innovations whose aesthetic virtuosity is energized by its ethical urgency.
Nor do the essayists in this collection shy away from the glaring and familiar problem of introducing Levinas in context of the
discussion of any work of literature. On the one hand, it is a commonplace of Levinas studies that Levinas distrusted art as an escape
or evasion. Inasmuch as art provides us with selfish pleasures and
enables our escape from the real world, it offers us a kind of false
transcendence. In this respect, art remains but an idol: a lifeless
object put in place of the living Other. On the other hand, Levinas
readily admitted his philosophical debts to specific authors and
referred often to their literary works in his own writings (Shakespeare being for him among the most prominent). The best authors,
for Levinas, not only recognize and resist art’s idolatrous potential
but also wrestle with the core philosophical and religious questions
that it raises. If we take seriously a question Levinas asks—“is not
reading a way of inhabiting? The volume of the book as a form of
living space!”—then inhabiting the living spaces of Shakespeare
and Levinas can contribute to contemporary debates concerning
art’s ability (or inability) to show us the way out of Being, engaging
us in the difficulties of freeing ourselves from the ontological constraints in which we all of necessity reside (BV 128). Reading and
performing great art together in the company of profound ethical
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criticism and philosophic writing—might not such an “inhabiting”
form a kind of ethical discourse that continually interrupts itself
and calls itself into question? Shakespeare’s art, it would seem,
does as much in spades. His works continue to surprise, bewilder,
and evade us, compelling us to make a response, and then examine
that response in advance.
What about scriptural writing, which is often the mainstay of
Levinas’s religious studies subject matter? The bringing together
of the ethical and the literary also brings the literary into dialogue
with religious concerns and so in scholarship with religious studies.
Not surprisingly, Levinas insists that the task of the commentator on scripture and writing about scripture is not to solve, settle,
or decipher the text but to renew it. The “life of the Talmudist,”
Levinas writes, “is nothing but the permanent renewal of the letter
through the intelligence” (NT 79). Taking this comment beyond
the Talmud to apply to literary writing at large and Shakespeare’s
writing in particular, this volume claims that no amount of erudition,
historical contextualization, or critical knowledge of Shakespeare
can substitute for the unceasing work of asking questions of the
text (and listening to the questions the text poses to us). Anything
but its incessant questioning threatens to turn the text into a dead
letter, an academic artifact containing obscurities of no interest to
students, scholars, or any other popular or high brow readers.
In the present collection, then, we turn to these two great writers
in an attempt to bring some measure of “renewal” to Shakespeare’s
and Levinas’s works through our approach to them. It is our hope
that the essays contained herein perform the kind of responsible
questioning that ought to provoke a new and viable ethical criticism,
a critical writing that engages at the deepest level what it means
to be a subject for whom ethical considerations are a part of the
very air one breathes. As a volume with interests in philosophy,
religious studies, and literary criticism, among other fields, it should
be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in various
areas of modern philosophy and contemporary religious thought, as
well as those engaged in Shakespeare and Early Modern Studies,
and, more generally, in literary criticism and theory. The collection
endeavors to offer seasoned experts across the disciplines it engages
fresh and compelling arguments while offering beginning graduate
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students and advanced undergraduates accessible orientation to
scholarly study of Levinas, Shakespeare, and the issues their implied
dialogue opens up.
* * *
In “A Meditation,” which was originally titled “Some Reflections on
Levinas on Shakespeare,” Richard A. Cohen opens the door to the
discussion we would follow in this collection. Examining carefully
what appears to be every known reference in Levinas to Shakespeare
in the published works of the philosopher, Cohen makes the case in
full for the centrality of Shakespeare to Levinas’s critical project. As
such, his essay remains a tribute to the richness of both writers, and
we have duly chosen to reproduce his contribution as the rightful
progenitor of this field of joint inquiry, a tribute echoed in numerous
essays within this collection.
Within the essay, Cohen begins by unpacking Levinas’s declaration
(cited above) “that the whole of philosophy is but a meditation of
Shakespeare.” Noting the philosopher’s striking use of the possessive
“of” in relating philosophy to Shakespeare, the author argues that this
phrasing suggests “not that all of philosophy is a meditation about
Shakespeare . . . but rather that the whole of philosophy is a meditation
by Shakespeare, Shakespeare’s meditation,” Shakespeare meditating on
philosophy.11 Cohen explores the degree to which Shakespeare’s world
reverberates with various forms of moral exigency, religious rigor, the
call to justice, and the demands of other great literature. Attending to
“the elevating exigencies of an ethical metaphysics [that] find their full
expression in a Shakespeare as they can find their proper articulation in
all the world’s great literatures,” Cohen surmises that Shakespeare dramatizes what Levinas would recognize as human worlds with human
characters driven to the heights of justice and morality. The Bard in
this reading is not a moralist with flavorful maxims to distribute, but
rather, his writings give “testimony to the Infinite” (EI 116). As such,
Cohen’s clear survey of Levinas on Shakespeare has indeed offered
many readers a way into the rigors of ethical exegesis.
But since the publication of Cohen’s essay in 2001, Levinas’s prison
notebooks have been found and published. These are writings he
composed while imprisoned during the Second World War. These
notebooks reveal a striking correlation with both the philosopher’s
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earlier ideas (written in the thirties) and his later ideas as expressed
in Existence and Existents, Time and the Other, and other texts. This
correlation is especially evident in his comments about Shakespeare
and in particular the tragedies. Here for example is a sample of his
comments about Shakespeare as the “fabricator of nothingness”:
Shakespearean tragedy is above all the contact of man and nothingness, of nothingness in its ambiguity [son équivoque], in its
diabolical form. Lie (King Lear, Othello), the ambiguity [équivoque] of the witches (Macbeth), the ghost (Hamlet). And from
it derives the essential role in most Shakespearean tragedies of
the liar and the traitor. Shakespeare is the fabricator of nothingness; he who gives to nothingness the appearances of being.
The character Hamlet is particularly profound [in this regard],
for there man has pierced ambiguity or rather he has made
of this ambiguity the very theme of suffering. Hamlet is the
reflection upon Shakespearean tragedy itself. He suffers from
the insinuation of nothingness within being or of being within
nothingness. To be or not to be—everything is there.
I take up again the theme of death: the fact that death equals
the loss of the capacity to play shows that death is not as strong
as being. Even if it concludes being, it does not exhaust all
that being has done. Therefore, even within the hypothesis of
Macbeth, it is neither an end nor within . . . .
Macbeth too, like Hamlet, is frightened by the fact that death
perhaps does not exist—that it resolves nothing. His fright in
seeing Banquo is in this sense the culminating point of the tragedy. It is starting from this moment moreover that he is without
fear in the crime and that these scruples against which Lady
Macbeth had fought no longer exist for him. Why? Despair
(CC 174, 195‑196).12
As Richard Cohen argued before the prison notebooks were published, and as Howard Caygill remarked more recently upon the
publication of the Carnets material, these writings are invaluable for
acknowledging and responding to “the importance of Shakespeare
for Levinas’s philosophizing.”13
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Cohen’s essay is followed here by three essays on one of the tragedies, King Lear. In “Lear’s ‘Darker Purpose’,” Sandor Goodhart
takes a distinctly counter-redemptive view. He suggests that the
play stages what might be characterized, echoing the king’s own
language, as Lear’s “darker purpose.” “No rescue? What, a prisoner?” (4.6.191) Lear exclaims at one point, when he awakens on
the heath, a sick, frail, and dying old man in the long central storm
scenes, as if the whole maneuver of dividing up the kingdom has
been explicitly undertaken in the expectation of a fairy-tale ending, the kind of happy conclusion or “promised end” that indeed
the story on which the play is based encouraged. In Shakespeare’s
assessment of the world, Goodhart argues, Lear dies holding his
dead daughter Cordelia in his arms, a lurid testimony only to his
inability to distinguish a live human being from a deceased one (“I
know when one is dead, and when one lives,” he says (5.3.261)),
projective fantasies from real human relations. Levinas clarifies in
Goodhart’s view the perspective that Lear fails to read (lire, in
French), and which constitutes one of the sources of his delirium:
namely, infinite responsibility for the other individual, the other
human being, the neighbor.
Ann Astell offers a second essay on Lear. After highlighting their
mutual interest in Shakespearean drama, Bible, and law, Astell
imagines Levinas and theorist René Girard as “Readers of King
Lear.” She speculates that Levinas would foreground the bonds
of filial and parental piety that establish “vertical” relationships
between characters, whereas Girard would focus on the “horizontal” relationships of sibling rivalry. These complementary critical
axiologies meet, in Astell’s analysis, at the play’s center, in the
violence of the storm on the heath, where Girard’s scapegoated
outcast encounters Levinas’s needy orphan. This encounter, in turn,
serves to transform the disguised Edgar into an apocalyptic figure
whose self-revelation at the play’s conclusion renews the revelation
of commandment itself.
In a third essay on Lear, “Theology, Phenomenology, and the
Divine in King Lear,” Kent R. Lehnhof observes that Cordelia figures into Shakespeare’s King Lear much as l’autrui figures into
Levinas’s philosophy. The one who overawes, obsesses, and afflicts
Lear, Cordelia is also in his view the one who summons and solicits
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him from “beyond being.” She “disincarnates” the divine in the
play in a non-systematic and non-thematizable way. This is not
to say, in his view, that Lear is finally and simply a Levinasian
fable of some kind. Rather, it is to suggest that Shakespeare was as
invested in interpersonal relationships as was Levinas and appears
to have entertained some similar ideas about them, including the
idea that transcendence is not an effect of ecstasy or apotheosis
but of interrelation.
In “Investment, Return, Alterity, and The Merchant of Venice,”
Geoffrey Baker uses the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, in particular the overlooked leitmotif of circulation, in order to re-assess
the location of social critique in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of
Venice. Levinas’s understanding of circulation and giving can be
understood, respectively, as forms of return and non-return. Read
in this way, The Merchant of Venice produces and negotiates several
key binaries, familiar to even more traditional readings of the play,
as effects of circulation or giving, including Judaism and Christianity,
justice and mercy, outbound and homeward journeys, investments
returned and investments lost, taking and giving. A Levinas-based
reading of these structures and their prominent role in Shakespeare’s
play demonstrates to what great extent they are all interwoven and
invested in each other, and in what manner rampant venture capital, simultaneously the pride and fall of Venice, is implicated at
every step. Focused as Baker is upon the structures of meaning
that enable and limit ethical relations in The Merchant of Venice,
Shakespeare in his view emerges as a social critic more interested in
interrogating the epistemological foundations than the mere social
forces of economic relations.
In their jointly authored paper, “Traces, Faces, and Ghosts,”
Hilaire Kallendorf and Claire Katz approach the relationship
between Levinas and Shakespeare by examining an under theorized theme—the role of the ghost in the works of both authors.
In his 1946/7 lecture course, Time and the Other, Levinas forges
both explicit and implicit connections among several of his central
themes—the trace, the face, alterity, the ethical—connecting these
themes to the ghost through his reference to a “visitation.” This essay
examines the relationship between the face and the trace, using the
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ghostly apparition, especially in Macbeth, as a way to connect these
tropes in Levinas’s work.
In “From Horror to Solitude to Maternity,” Steven Shankman
reflects upon the way Shakespeare figures in Levinas’s philosophical development from the time of the appearance of Existence
and Existents and Time and Other, both published just after the
Second World War, through Humanism of the Other and Otherwise than Being in the early 1970s; and secondly, he considers how
Levinas’s thought can, in turn, open up the ethical dimension of
Macbeth, Hamlet, and King Lear, three plays that Levinas particularly admired. His essay thus places Shakespeare’s three greatest
tragedies (Macbeth, Hamlet, and Lear) in the context of Levinas’s
developing ideas as a philosopher, and it suggests how, if we read
these plays with Levinas’s thought in mind, we can see in them as
yet unrevealed ethical depths.
In “The Frustration of Desire and the Weakness of Power in
Venus and Adonis,” Sean Lawrence brings Levinas’s critique of
representation and his description of the erotic relationship to bear
on “Venus and Adonis,” one of Shakespeare’s little-studied narrative
poems. The recalcitrance of the Other to power explains not only
why Venus fails to win the love of Adonis, but also why she must
fail, inevitably. Where recent critics have tended to understand most
relations as relations of power, a Levinasian reading allows us to see
how Shakespeare dramatizes the failure of power in the frustration
of Venus’s desire.
In “Ethical Ambiguity of the Maternal in Shakespeare’s First
Romances,” Donald Wehrs argues that within Shakespeare’s England,
the propensity of social affection to emerge from and resolve itself
back into self-centered concerns was identified with original sin,
but his romances challenge philosophical and theological accounts
of self-love’s primacy. Pericles and Cymbeline delineate how the
opening of the body to affect opens patriarchal cultural orders to
the corrective authority of feminine voices (both actual women
and maternal nature) and the soul to the regenerative effects of
forgiveness. What Shakespeare dramatizes resembles and may be
illuminated by Levinas’s analogous tracing of how felt experience
of the ethical enables the self to recover, in a romance-like way,
vital, redemptive parts of itself that, like daughters and wives in
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Shakespearean romance, tend to be occluded, lost, or forfeited, but
may, wondrously, be reclaimed and affirmed.
In “Culinary Skepticism in As You Like It and Montaigne’s ‘Of
Experience’,” David B. Goldstein argues that both Michel de Montaigne and Shakespeare anticipate Emmanuel Levinas’s argument
that eating forms a material basis for skeptical inquiry. Shakespeare’s
As You Like It uses eating as a tool to explore and articulate skeptical
approaches to knowledge. Its approach mirrors that of Montaigne’s
own brand of culinary skepticism, expressed most clearly in the last
of his Essais, “Of Experience,” which documents human materiality
(especially through practices of eating and defecating, since these
actions expose us at our most material), in order to resist the ideology of abstract perfection that Montaigne and Shakespeare both
find so societally destructive. In one context, we find a skeptical and
anti-ethical phenomenon, in which eating is a form of devourment,
an exercise of power, a skeptical tearing apart of boundaries. In
another context, eating functions commensally and performatively,
helping to form ethically stable communities.
Finally, in “Staging Humanity in As You Like It and Pirkei Avot,”
Moshe Gold stages a reading and thinking together of Levinas
and Shakespeare’s comedy by way of the transmission of commentaries in Rabbinic thought on a specific Mishnah in Pirkei Avot,
one that catalogues distinct educational life stages. Rethinking the
dramatic, and pedagogical, encounters between Jaques and Rosalind, on the one hand, and the Seven Ages speech and a Rabbinic
staging of ages on the other, Gold argues that to better understand
the ramifications of a Levinasian Other as a teacher, we might
constructively consult what Levinas himself wrote in a note from
1946: “My philosophy—is a philosophy of the face-to-face. Relation
to the other, without intermediary. It is that of Judaism.”14 Blowing
on the coals of Rabbinic traditions that transmit commentaries
on one’s ethical/educational development, Gold helps Shakespeareans and Levinasians better understand how Shakespeare stages
and performs ethical behavior via particular responses to Jaques’s
pessimistic and static Seven Ages speech. In so doing, he argues
for a revision of critical methodology to move beyond thematic
religious explorations of a Shakespearean text to include Jewish
thought as challenging standard receptions of the play, Shakespeare
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studies, and Levinasian philosophy. In this manner, Gold commemorates a Jewish sermon given on the Tercentenary of the death of
Shakespeare in which the speaker, talking about “Shakespeare and
Rabbinic Thought,” refers to the great playwright as, among other
designations, “a teacher of ethics.”15
* * *
The essays that follow are far from the only essays that could have
been written to engage Levinas with Shakespeare and Shakespeare
with Levinas. But our hope remains that they will offer a first step,
a gateway to a future encounter between two powerful writers and
critical thinkers that will endure and prove beneficial for all concerned, an opening into which other authors will engage other plays
or poems or philosophic tracts and thereby pursue other avenues
along which critical thinking and the ethical will find themselves
irretrievably entangled.
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